2021 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

9-22-2021

Danielle Alston v. City of Philadelphia

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021

Recommended Citation
"Danielle Alston v. City of Philadelphia" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 816.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/816

This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in 2021 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 20-2906
_______________________
SERGEANT DANIELLE ALSTON,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, d/b/a Philadelphia Police Department;
LIEUTENANT BRIAN DOUGHERTY, individually and in his official capacity
as lieutenant for the Philadelphia Police Department
______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 2-18-cv-02362
District Judge: Honorable Joshua D. Wolson
__________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 21, 2021
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 22, 2021)

____________________
OPINION*
_____________________
SMITH, Chief Judge.
Danielle Alston, a former Sergeant with the Philadelphia Police Department,
filed suit against her immediate superior, Lieutenant Brian Dougherty, and the City
of Philadelphia, alleging, inter alia, a gender-based hostile-environment claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Starnes v. Butler Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl., 971 F.3d 416, 426 (3d Cir.
2020) (“The Equal Protection Clause proscribes sex-based discrimination.”).
Sergeant Alston’s claims against the City were dismissed. 22A. In response to
Lieutenant Dougherty’s motion for summary judgment, Sergeant Alston
abandoned one claim, opposing only the motion seeking summary judgment on her
gender-based hostile-environment claim. 205-06A. After the District Court
granted Lieutenant Dougherty’s motion for summary judgment, this timely appeal
followed.1

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment is plenary. Starnes, 971 F.3d at 424.

2

Section 1983 hostile-environment claims “require the same elements of proof
as a Title VII action.” Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 915 n.5 (3d Cir.
1983); see also Starnes, 971 F.3d at 426. In Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, this
Court instructed that:
five constituents must converge to bring a successful claim for a sexually
hostile work environment under Title VII (1) the employees suffered
intentional discrimination because of their sex; (2) the discrimination was
pervasive and regular;2 (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the
plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person
of the same sex in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior
liability.
895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251,
260 (3d Cir. 2001) (reiterating same elements to prove hostile work environment
claim).
In analyzing Sergeant Alston’s claim, the District Court considered the first
and fifth elements. It concluded that Sergeant Alston could not support her claim
with evidence of an errant text message that Lieutenant Dougherty sent to her
because there was “[n]o evidence” suggesting that the text was sent
“intentionally.” 6A. It noted that the record did not contradict Lieutenant
Dougherty’s assertion that the text was sent by accident and that the lieutenant
apologized in both a follow-up text and in person. Id.

2

We have clarified since Andrews that the second element is whether the discrimination
was “severe or pervasive.” Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2017).

3

Sergeant Alston contends this was error as the incident was “sufficiently
severe to create a hostile work environment,” Alston Br. 13, and she points to her
own testimony that she was “shocked,” id. at 15. We are not persuaded. Alston’s
subjective view of the errant text does not create an issue of fact about Lieutenant
Dougherty’s state of mind when the text was transmitted. Although she is correct
that a single incident may be severe enough to create a hostile environment,
Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264, the severity of the sole, misfired text at issue here
does not shed light on whether Dougherty acted intentionally.
Thus, we turn to Sergeant Alston’s other contention that the District Court
erred when it concluded that Alston failed to establish the existence of respondeat
superior liability for the hostile environment created by some of the other sergeants
and officers in the 35th District to which she was assigned. We have carefully
reviewed the record before us, and conclude that the evidence establishes that some
other officers were aware of some gender-based harassment of which Sergeant
Alston complains. But the record does not show that Lieutenant Dougherty had
actual or constructive notice of the gender-based harassment directed at Sergeant
Alston. While Alston testified that she had ongoing conversations with Dougherty,
she did not spell out the substance of those conversations and she admitted that she
did not inform him of the other officers’ harassing comments related to her
clothing. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err when it
4

determined that Sergeant Alston failed to show a basis for holding Lieutenant
Dougherty liable.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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